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Abstract: This paper takes four frameworks for understanding linguistic polite-
ness (Brown and Levinson, Watts, Terkourafi, Hall) and tests each on the same
corpus to see whether they yield results that are useful and/or in keeping with
the other information we have about the material. The corpus used consists of
661 polite requests made in letters by a single Roman author, Cicero. The results
demonstrate first that politeness theories are helpful as explanatory tools even
in dealing with very well-known material, and second that no one theory is
best: different theories are more and less useful in answering different ques-
tions about the data. It is therefore suggested that the use of multiple frame-
works will provide the best understanding of the data.
Keywords: politeness, ‘please’, Latin, Cicero, rogo, oro
1 Politeness theories
Modern analysis of linguistic politeness began nearly forty years ago when
Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987) produced a theory claiming to provide a uni-
fied, universally valid model for the underlying mechanisms of politeness. Yet
for most of that period their theory has been the subject of relentless criticism.
The criticism has been both comprehensive and effective, not only attacking
the theory from every conceivable angle but also disproving it convincingly
from multiple angles. Despite all this, Brown and Levinson’s theory remains in
Note: Much of the material in this chapter has also been published, aimed at a different
type of audience, in my “The rules of politeness and Latin request formulae”, in P. Probert
and A. Willi (eds), Laws and Rules in Indo-European (Oxford University Press 2012), pp. 313–
328. I am grateful to Philomen Probert for help and encouragement with this project and to
Marina Terkourafi for fruitful discussions, careful critiques, and patient corrections of my
misrepresentations of her theory. Any mistakes that remain are my own.
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common use, because it has a key benefit to users that none of its competitors
can offer: a simple template that can (it is claimed) be used to analyze the
politeness system of any language. The ease with which this template can be
deployed, even for languages of which the researcher has limited knowledge
and for which only small amounts of data are being used, makes it highly
attractive to researchers (cf., for example, Lloyd 2006 and Jucker 2012).
The question, of course, is whether application of this template produces
genuinely useful results: does it result in insights that we would not otherwise
have, and are those insights valid? And how does the usefulness of these in-
sights compare with those achieved by applying other, more recent models of
linguistic politeness (e.g., the eight others examined by Eelen in 2001 or the
numerous further models mentioned by Culpeper in 2011)? What about the ease
with which the template is applicable: in reality, how much harder are other
theories to use?
In order to examine these questions I have chosen three recent theories
and tested them and Brown and Levinson’s original theory on a large set of
very well-understood data. There are two goals, of which the first is to establish
whether any politeness theory can be useful as a way to understand texts that
have already been extensively studied from other angles. Most work on polite-
ness aims to understand politeness itself, not the corpus studied, but in order
to have a broader utility politeness theory should be able to shed light on
utterances and texts containing politeness. Work on contemporary usage often
employs data collected specifically for that study; such material is easy to illu-
minate as it has never been studied before. Work on historical usage is more
likely to demonstrate the utility of politeness theory in understanding material
that has already been studied, and indeed some excellent work has now been
done on historical politeness (see, for example, Culpeper and Kádár 2010 and
Bax and Kádár 2012). But even the historical studies often make use of material
that has previously received only a relatively small amount of linguistic atten-
tion; it is not surprising when a study reveals new insights into such texts. So
the question addressed here is whether material that has already been very
thoroughly studied can benefit from the application of politeness theories. Cice-
ro’s letters are an ideal corpus from that perspective, since they have already
been so exhaustively studied (see below) that it is inherently unlikely that any
more insights could be extracted by linguistic study.
Our second goal is to find out how the different theories compare to one
another in the quality of the results produced and the amount of effort needed
to get those results. The three theories were chosen on the grounds that each
has a claim to be the most useful theory in this context: they are Watts’s, which
has received more widespread attention than most of the other post-Brown-
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and-Levinson theories and might a priori therefore be expected to be the best;
Hall’s, which was derived specifically for use with Latin and ought for that
reason to be the most helpful; and Terkourafi’s, which I have found to be
particularly helpful in analysis of ancient Greek (cf. Dickey 2016) and which
might therefore be expected to be helpful for Latin.
1.1 Brown and Levinson
This theory holds that utterances become polite by fulfilling the addressee’s
social needs. Brown and Levinson (1987) hold that there are two main types of
such needs, each of which is addressed by a different type of politeness; these
two types are called positive and negative politeness. The former consists of
words and other behaviours that address an interlocutor’s need for people to
be nice to him/her, for example by showing affection for, interest in, approval
of, or solidarity with the interlocutor; negative politeness by contrast addresses
an interlocutor’s need not to be pestered or interfered with, for example by
phrasing a request indirectly in order to make it easy to refuse, showing defer-
ence to the interlocutor’s status, or apologizing. The theory also claims that
choice between these two types of politeness is determined by the power differ-
ential between speaker and addressee, the amount of intimacy between them,1
and the magnitude of the issue that gives rise to the need for politeness in the
first place. Negative politeness is used when there is greater distance between
speaker and addressee, when the addressee has a significant amount of power
over the speaker, and/or when the issue at hand is of considerable magnitude;
positive politeness is used when there is greater intimacy between the parties,
when the speaker is equal or superior to the addressee in power and status,
and/or when the issue at hand is minor (Brown and Levinson 1987: 71–84).
Thus someone who makes a request with “Do you suppose you could possibly
find a few minutes to do this for me?” is talking to someone distant and/or a
superior, and/or is making a major request; on the other hand someone who
says “Mike, I’m sure you’ll do this for me – thank you so much!” is talking to
an intimate and/or inferior, and/or is making a minor request.
These conclusions seem intuitively right to English speakers, and because
Brown and Levinson looked not only at English but also at two unrelated lan-
guages in which they found similar patterns, they claimed universality for their
1 Brown and Levinson (1987: 76–77) phrased this as “the degree of similarity/difference
between S[peaker] and H[earer] based on frequency of interaction and kinds of material or
non-material goods exchanged.”
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theory. Because of this universality and because the key distinctions typically
rely on the lexical and semantic meanings of the phrases used, Brown and
Levinson’s model has great predictive power: when presented with a literal
translation of an isolated utterance in a language about which one knows noth-
ing, one ought in theory to be able to tell whether it is polite – and, if so, why.
(Brown and Levinson did not explicitly claim such predictive power and might
not have wanted to endorse the strong formulation presented here – they would
have said, quite fairly, that of course there are always exceptions – but it is
implied by their discussion and their claim of universality for their rules, and
it is often assumed by those who apply their theory.) Moreover, with this theory
any utterance that can be identified as positively or negatively polite supposed-
ly tells a researcher something about the relationship of the speaker to the
addressee and/or about the weighting of the request (or other politeness-requir-
ing act) in their culture.
A piece of this length does not have space for a detailed account of the
objections that have been raised to Brown and Levinson’s theory (for this, see
Eelen 2001; Watts 2003: 85–116; Culpeper 2011: 404–413), but a brief summary
will be useful. Much of the opposition has attacked the theory’s reliance, as
reflected in the terminology with which Brown and Levinson originally pro-
posed it, on certain other theories that have since been challenged or discredit-
ed. However, as I have just demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, the
theory can be restated without any technical terminology apart from “positive
politeness” and “negative politeness”, which were invented by Brown and Lev-
inson themselves, and it still seems intuitively correct when so stated. (Admit-
tedly these terms were not created ex nihilo – they are closely linked to the
concepts of positive and negative face – but they can stand on their own, so
acceptance or rejection of their antecedents cannot in itself be relevant to the
validity of Brown and Levinson’s theory.) Since the primary argument in favour
of the theory has always been this appearance of obvious rightness, it cannot
be disproven by attacking any theoretical basis that can be removed without
changing that appearance (pace Arundale 2008).
More serious challenges arise from the existence of cultures in which the
vast majority of politeness falls into one or the other of Brown and Levinson’s
two categories (regardless of variation in distance, power, and magnitude of
the politeness-requiring act). Brown and Levinson were themselves aware of
this problem and explained the existence of such “positive politeness cultures”
and “negative politeness cultures” by suggesting that in such cultures one of
their key variables could be permanently set at one end of its range. Thus a
positive politeness culture could result from a cultural inclination to consider
all requests minor, or to consider all interpersonal distance small (Brown and
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Levinson 1987: 242–253). But researchers in these cultures have not on the
whole been convinced by this argument, and in practical terms Brown and
Levinson’s theory is not very useful for studying politeness in such languages.
Nevertheless, these problems only challenge the theory’s universality and do
not affect its usefulness for those cultures to which it does seem to apply: a
framework that is not universal may nevertheless be genuinely applicable to a
large number of different cultures.
There is also the difficulty that Brown and Levinson never really attempted
to prove, in any methodologically rigorous fashion, the connection between
either type of politeness and the factors on which they claim it depends; they
provided plenty of examples (a number of them invented), but rather than
taking a corpus and showing that the negative-politeness elements in it were
consistently associated with certain factors and the positive-politeness el-
ements consistently associated with other factors, they left the fact that the
association seems intuitively obvious (to English speakers) to speak for itself.
Subsequent attempts to test Brown and Levinson’s theory against actual real-
life data have not on the whole upheld their views. For example, Terkourafi
(2002, cf. 2004) has shown that in pairs of linguistic strategies that ought to be
equivalent according to Brown and Levinson one may be marked and the other
unmarked, making them pragmatically very different from one another.
Lastly, the theory’s predictive power is reduced by the existence of utteran-
ces containing both positive and negative politeness strategies, as “Darling,
could you lend me that book?”, which combines a positive politeness strategy
in the affectionate address with a negative politeness strategy in the indirect
phrasing of the request as a question. In fact the frequency of this combination
makes it very difficult to apply a distinction between positive and negative
politeness to English requests, and thus to use the predictive powers of Brown
and Levinson’s theory, even in English. Brown and Levinson did discuss this
issue (1987: 19–20, 230–233), but that does not remove it as an obstacle to using
their theory in a predictive fashion.
Particularly problematic in this respect is the most common and fundamen-
tal of English polite request formulae, “please”. Though Brown and Levinson
did not explicitly so classify it, “please” is often taken to be a marker of nega-
tive politeness, since it is a shortened form of “may it please you” or “if you
please”, phrases that acknowledge the recipient’s right not to comply with the
request. Often English “please” is indeed used in ways that match this basic
meaning: for example in “Please pass the salt” the word “please” turns the
impolite command “Pass the salt” into a polite request.
But in some other contexts “please” has a different function. A request to
pass the salt could be phrased with simply “Salt, please!”; here “please” turns
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the otherwise opaque utterance “Salt” into a request. And a child who wants
an ice-cream cone might say “Please, please, please, Mummy, please gimme
ice cream, please, please!”; in this request “please” makes it harder, not easier,
for the mother to refuse the child’s demands (cf. Leech 2014: 161–162). Terms
with such a request-intensifying function are often described as “urgent”, and
urgency in this sense is often considered not to be polite at all; in fact it is
essentially the opposite of negative politeness (see Risselada 1993: 254–255,
who makes this point about Latin).
What all this means is that the term “please” cannot be consistently classi-
fied as a marker of negative politeness: it can indeed be such a marker, but it
can also have other functions, including one that is diametrically opposed to
negative politeness. This example demonstrates that politeness usage cannot
always be safely predicted from a term’s lexical or etymological meaning.
Testing Brown and Levinson’s theory is complicated by the fact that subse-
quent researchers have interpreted and elaborated the theory in different ways
according to their own needs and those of the languages they were studying;
this problem is compounded by the issue that Brown and Levinson themselves
did not express their ideas as clearly as they might have done. Particularly
relevant here is an uncertainty about the extent to which reliance on Brown
and Levinson entitles one to ignore the context in which an utterance is pro-
duced: on the one hand they did not make such a claim, but on the other hand
their use of some contextless examples implies it. Many subsequent researchers
have used the theory without regard for context or for utterances that have no
context, but by no means all applications of Brown and Levinson fall into this
category. For the purpose of this paper the “contextless” interpretation of
Brown and Levinson will be used, but it is not claimed that this interpretation
necessarily goes back to Brown and Levinson themselves.
1.2 Terkourafi
Terkourafi (e.g., 2002, 2005, 2008, forthcoming) bases politeness on frequency
of usage rather than lexical meaning and argues in essence that what is fre-
quent in a given situation is polite in that situation. (This type of politeness
is unmarked politeness; Terkourafi’s theory also allows for marked (unusual)
politeness but declines to provide predictive rules for the specific forms it may
take.) Many situations in which interpersonal interaction occurs are common
and frequently repeated; in these situations there is an expected sequence of
formulaic politeness, and people who deviate from the expected formulae, even
in a direction that might seem to an outside observer more polite than the expect-
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ed formulae, may be perceived as behaving impolitely. For example in a com-
munity where shopkeepers normally ask for payment with a simple statement
of the amount owed (e.g., “That’ll be twelve pound forty-five, then”), if one
shopkeeper were to start saying “So sorry to trouble you, but do you suppose
you could possibly pay twelve pounds and forty-five pence for that, please?”,
his customers would be more likely to assume that he was making fun of them,
an impolite move, than that he was being polite.
Although the seeds of this idea can be discerned in Brown and Levinson,
it plays a minor role in their theory and is often entirely disregarded by their
followers; by giving frequency much greater importance than semantic mean-
ing Terkourafi ends up with a system that functions very differently from that
of Brown and Levinson.
Terkourafi’s framework was originally developed on a corpus of modern
(Cypriot) Greek by a native speaker of that language; the other theories consid-
ered here were all developed by English speakers.
1.3 Watts
On the other hand Watts (2003) has proposed a view of politeness that, while
in some respects very similar to Terkourafi’s, is in one important feature its
opposite: for Watts only that which is not usual (i.e., Terkourafi’s marked po-
liteness) should be termed “polite”. What is normal and expected in a particu-
lar context should, he argues, be termed “politic behaviour” and distinguished
from especially noticeable courtesy, or “polite” behaviour. For example, Ter-
kourafi and Watts agree that in a community where shopkeepers always say
“Have a nice day” to customers, and customers always use “please” when re-
questing something, these expressions are not noticed or remarked on – though
of course their absence would be. But Watts, unlike Terkourafi, then argues
that because only the unusual courtesy is perceived as polite, only these courte-
sies can properly be called “politeness” and form the subject of research on
politeness. Like Terkourafi, Watts does not provide predictive generalizations
for this (marked) type of politeness; each instance must, he believes, be consid-
ered on an individual basis. The result is that Watts provides no predictive
generalizations about “politeness” at all. We can thus eliminate Watts’s theory
from our analysis already: it is not going to be of any help in understanding
the polite request formulae in our corpus.
Nevertheless, a study with a different type of data might have found Watts’
work more helpful. For example, Paternoster (2010) successfully uses Watts to
illuminate historical politeness data from Italian (since the data contain explicit
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reflections on politeness, something that Watts discusses). With our data we
could, of course, consider the possibility that in Watts’s framework the common
request formulae are “politic” rather than polite; if we do that, Watts’s theory
might in theory yield essentially the same results as Terkourafi’s. But Terkourafi
is much more explicit on this point, since Watts does not clearly discuss the
result of frequency in making certain behaviors politic and does not use quanti-
tative methods in any of his analyses. Instead he discusses isolated examples
that do not allow the reader to judge the extent to which particular expressions
are frequent in specific contexts.
1.4 Hall
Finally, a much less well-known theory is of special relevance for our data
because it was formulated specifically for Latin politeness. Jon Hall (2009: 8–
15) has adapted Brown and Levinson’s classification for the Roman world by
proposing three categories rather than two (cf. a similar move by Jucker 2012).
Hall’s category of “affiliative politeness” is very similar to positive politeness,
and his “redressive politeness” is essentially the same as negative politeness.
To these he (Hall 2009: 13) adds “the politeness of respect (uerecundia),” which
aims “to acknowledge a decisive social distance between writer and addressee”
and is characterized by restrained and formal language; this category draws
heavily on the work of Kaster (2005). Although Hall does not explicitly make
this comparison, his uerecundia is very similar to Watts’s politic behaviour.
Hall faces an issue that is of less concern to the other theorists we have exam-
ined, namely sincerity. Romans sometimes used overtly polite language when
engaging in serious conflict, and they also sometimes used polite language to
express affection they did not feel. Since Romans officially valued integrity and
sincerity, such politeness could backfire; for example after Cicero came into
open conflict with Antony, Antony caused him severe embarrassment by publi-
cizing an overly affectionate letter Cicero had written earlier.
2 Latin request formulae
The corpus on which these theories will be tested consists of polite requests in
Latin letters.
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2.1 Background
Though classical Latin was spoken about two thousand years ago, a great deal
is known about it, for an enormous amount of literature survives. This literature
provides us with a large body of Latin requests, mostly in drama (especially
the comedies of Plautus and Terence) and letters (especially those of Cicero
and Pliny the Younger). The works of all four of these authors have been exten-
sively studied and as a result are well understood, so that it is usually possible
to obtain reasonably detailed information on the relationship between the two
parties to an interaction, the context of that interaction, and the exact meanings
of the words used in the interaction.
Unfortunately, each of these four authors lived at a different time (Plautus
in the third and early second century B.C., Terence in the second century B.C.,
Cicero in the first century B.C., and Pliny in the first and early second century
A.D.), and Latin was continually evolving during and between their lifetimes.
Although Pliny, the latest of these authors, writes in what is recognizably the
same language as Plautus, the earliest, there are significant differences in the
varieties of Latin used. Moreover, in modern times variations in politeness prac-
tice have often been shown to exist even within a single culture; it would be
foolish to assume that even at one point in time all Latin speakers in the enor-
mous Roman Empire used exactly the same rules of politeness. Social variation
within Latin is widely acknowledged to have existed (cf. Adams 2013); it used
to be claimed that regional variation did not exist, but that myth has now
largely been exploded (see Adams 2007). In order to gain accurate information
on something as precise and specific as politeness, it is necessary to concen-
trate on utterances produced by a single author, and under those circumstances
the best source of information is the letters of Cicero,2 which contain more
requests than any other body of Latin written by one individual. (Some letters
preserved as part of the Ciceronian corpus are letters to Cicero rather than from
him; these have been removed from the corpus for the purposes of this analysis.
Therefore, in what follows “Cicero’s letters” should be understood to refer to
all and only those letters that were written by Cicero himself.) Letters also
provide good material for analyzing an ancient language because we know that
the original addressee of a letter did not gain any extra-linguistic information
from tone, gestures, etc. that are no longer available to us.
2 The English-speaking reader can best access this corpus via the bilingual editions of D. R.
Shackleton Bailey (1999, 2001, 2002) published as part of the Loeb Classical Library series of
Harvard University Press. The standard reference format for these letters, used below, employs
the abbreviations Att. (= Epistulae ad Atticum), Fam. (= Epistulae ad Familiares), and Q.fr.
(= Epistulae ad Quintum fratrem) followed by numbers indicating the book, letter, and paragraph.
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Cicero was an important political figure in the tumultuous period when the
Roman Republic was turning into the Empire. He was consul (the highest office
in the Republic) in 63 B.C., when the revolutionary Catiline led an unsuccessful
conspiracy against the government; Cicero was credited with saving the state
on that occasion and never allowed anyone to forget it, a fact that clearly an-
noyed his contemporaries. Unlike Caesar, Pompey, and the ultimately trium-
phant Augustus, whose primary strengths were military leadership, Cicero’s
strong point was oratory; he was generally acknowledged to be Rome’s greatest
speaker and the best writer of Latin prose. Those skills were eventually respon-
sible for his murder in 43 B.C. on orders from Antony, whom Cicero had at-
tacked in a series of devastating speeches. But Cicero’s vast literary output
survived and remained an object of study and emulation without interruption
to modern times: even today, students learning to write Latin are regularly told
to imitate Cicero.
The letters range from brief notes to Cicero’s close friend Atticus to lengthy
official reports to the Senate; although some were written to face public scruti-
ny, many are private, informal documents intended only for the eyes of Cicero’s
wife, brother, or closest friends. They contain detailed descriptions of the politi-
cal machinations and unrest that led to the end of the Republic, from someone
who was personally involved, and as such have always been highly valued
as historical documents. They were published after Cicero’s death in several
collections and rapidly became models for subsequent Latin epistolography; by
the middle of the second century AD the acclaimed writer Fronto could com-
ment that “nothing is more perfect than the letters of Cicero” (van den Hout
1988: 104 line 14). Although the letters were transmitted via copies made by
successive scribes, a process that often introduces errors or even deliberate
changes to the original text, the respect in which Cicero’s style was held en-
sured that they were copied carefully and completely, without changes to the
original wording. In the modern period Cicero’s letters have been extensively
studied and are central to our understanding both of late Republican history
and politics and of the Latin language at that period; see for example the mas-
sive commentaries by Shackleton Bailey (1965–1970, 1977, 1980) and the fre-
quent use of the letters in linguistic research by Adams (e.g., 1978, 2003: 308–
347). They are thus an ideal example of a very well understood body of text.
Significant previous work on Latin requests includes that of Rodie Rissela-
da (1993), who analyzed Latin directives from the perspective of speech act
theory. Her results were based on a corpus of selections from Plautus, Terence,
Cicero, and Pliny (Risselada 1993: 20 n. 31); although the selections are rela-
tively short and therefore the corpus of data not as large as one might have
hoped, her analysis is rigorous and her conclusions generally respected. Risse-
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lada found that unlike in English, where it is usually considered rude not to
say “please” or use an equivalent phrase when making a request, in Latin most
directives were not accompanied by request formulae or indeed any type of
overt politeness: requests could be expressed simply with an imperative with-
out sounding rude (Risselada 1993: 155, 163; cf. a similar situation in modern
Polish as explained by Wierzbicka 1991: 32–37).
Because we have so many Latin directives surviving, however, even the
minority that make use of overt politeness markers constitutes a substantial
body of data. In this group one can identify certain words and phrases that
occur frequently and were evidently formulaic; in Cicero’s day the most com-
mon of these formulae were uelim ‘I would like’, quaeso ‘I ask’, rogo ‘I ask’,
peto ‘I ask’, and oro ‘I beg’, which together occur 661 times in his letters. (Velim
is used 398 times, quaeso 64 times, rogo 99 times, peto 72 times, and oro 28
times. These figures include only occurrences with requests; some of these
terms are also used frequently with questions, but those occurrences are not
relevant – unless the question is itself a direct or indirect request, but that
happens not to occur with these words in our corpus.) The usage of these terms
is well understood.3
Risselada (1993: 254–255), without subscribing to any particular theory of
politeness, argues that in general these terms are polite because they soften a
request by making its fulfilment optional (1993: 250–252; Roesch [2004: 145–
146] makes a similar claim about uelim), but that oro is not polite at all, rather
urgent and emphatic. These claims can serve as a starting point for our exami-
nation, though of course they will have to be verified. We shall therefore start
with the four terms generally agreed to be polite and consider what, if any-
thing, can be learned from the application of each of the politeness theories
described above; oro must be considered separately because it may not be po-
lite at all.
2.2 Uelim, quaeso, rogo, and peto in Cicero’s letters
To use Terkourafi’s theory to understand uelim ‘I would like’, quaeso ‘I ask’,
rogo ‘I ask’, and peto ‘I ask’, a considerable amount of additional information
is required: we need to examine the frequency with which these terms are used
in particular contexts before their politeness can be evaluated.
3 See Dickey (2012, 2015), Halla-aho (2010), Lech (2010: 87–117), Núñez (1995), Risselada (1989,
1993: 233–328), Adams (1984), Carney (1964), etc.
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When this additional information is gathered, we find that all four of these
terms are frequent with requests and that there are some distinctions in their
usage: uelim and quaeso are used more often to intimates than to non-inti-
mates, while rogo and peto have the reverse distribution, and uelim is most
common with very minor requests, quaeso with slightly more onerous ones,
rogo with major ones, and peto with the most burdensome and important re-
quests (see Dickey 2012 for more information and evidence). In establishing the
intimates/non-intimates distinction I have controlled for the greater frequency
of minor requests in letters to intimates. There are also register distinctions
among these terms: quaeso belongs to a somewhat higher register than the
others and rogo to a somewhat lower one. Typical uses of these terms are illus-
trated in (1–4) below:
(1) illud tamen quod scribit animaduertas uelim, de portorio circumuectionis;
ait se de consili sententia rem ad senatum reiecisse. (Att. 2.16.4, to Atticus)
‘Nevertheless I would like you to pay attention to what (my brother) writes
about excise duty on transferred goods; he says that he referred the matter
to the senate owing to the opinion of his advisers.’
(2) da igitur, quaeso, negotium Pharnaci, Antaeo, Saluio ut id nomen ex omni-
bus libris tollatur. (Att. 13.44.3, to Atticus)
‘So, I ask you, give Pharnaces, Antaeus, and Salvius the job of deleting
that name from all the copies.’
(3) ego te plane rogo, atque ita ut maiore studio, iustiore de causa, magis ex
animo rogare nihil possim, ut Albanio parcas, praedia Laberiana ne attin-
gas. (Fam. 13.8.3, to M. Rutilius)
‘I ask you plainly, and in such a way that I couldn’t ask anything with
greater earnestness, in a juster cause, or more from my heart – I ask you
to spare Albanius and not to touch the estates that belonged to Laberius.’
(4) magno opere a te peto ut operam des efficiasque ne quid mihi fiat iniuriae
neue quid temporis ad meum annuum munus accedat. quod si feceris, ma-
gnus ad tua pristina erga me studia cumulus accedet. (Fam. 15.12.2, to L.
Paullus)
‘I earnestly request from you that you try and make sure that no injury is
done to me and that no time is added to my annual tour of duty. If you do
that, a crowning glory will be added to your earlier efforts on my behalf.’
According to Terkourafi’s theory, then, each of these terms is polite when used
with the particular type of request to which it is suited, not because their lexical
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meanings make them softeners but simply because of the convention that they
should be used with such requests.
Brown and Levinson’s and Hall’s theories, on the other hand, suggest that
we should look at the words’ lexical meanings to determine whether and how
they are polite. These lexical meanings, ‘I would like’ for uelim and ‘I ask’ for
quaeso, rogo, and peto, are not completely easy to classify, but when added to
a request such a qualifier might very well convey to the addressee that it was
optional, as Risselada claims. Thus in Brown and Levinson’s terms these would
be elements of negative politeness, and in Hall’s terms they would be elements
of redressive politeness.
Such a classification, however, has some further implications. If these four
terms are elements of negative politeness, uelim ought to be more indirect than
the other terms, because stating that one would like something to be done
makes compliance more optional than pointing out that one is asking the
speaker to do it. So one would expect uelim to be used for somewhat more
major requests, all else being equal, than the other terms. But this is exactly
the reverse of the terms’ attested usage.
A second set of difficulties comes with the implication that the four most
common polite request formulae in Cicero’s repertoire all express negative
rather than positive politeness. First, it is often observed that Roman culture
leaned more towards positive than negative politeness (cf., e.g., Risselada 1993:
92 n. 30; Dickey 2002: 94), so this result would make the request formulae
anomalous in the context of Roman politeness as a whole.
Second, since in Brown and Levinson’s view positive politeness is more
likely to be used to intimates, equals, and inferiors, while negative politeness
is more likely to be used to social superiors and to those distant from the
speaker, Cicero in particular might be expected to prefer positive politeness.
More than half his extant letters were written to close friends and relatives:
chiefly his close friend Atticus, his brother Quintus, and his wife Terentia, who
between them account for 53% of the letters and 55% of the requests using
these four terms. (These three addressees do not, however, receive exactly the
same types of request as others, as they tend to be cajoled less often with rogo
and peto and more often with uelim and quaeso [for the details, see Dickey
2012: 742–744]). It seems surprising to have overwhelmingly negative politeness
with the requests in those letters.
Third, Cicero had a very high status in Rome, being a former consul, and
the effect on his language of this objectively high status would have been exag-
gerated by his unusually good opinion of himself. He believed that he had
saved the Roman state from destruction by Catiline, and he thought this deed
entitled him to constant honour from his fellow citizens. He did not consider
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very many correspondents to be his superiors. If the vast majority of Cicero’s
polite requests use negative politeness strategies, Brown and Levinson’s theory
would make Cicero a far more humble character than we know him to have
been.
One could conclude on the basis of this evidence that Brown and Levin-
son’s theory (and by extension Hall’s) does not work; the different elements
that they claimed for negative politeness do not in fact go together. But there
is also another possibility here: perhaps it is Risselada’s explanation of the
terms’ function as markers of optionality that is the problem. A word meaning
“I ask” need not necessarily indicate that fulfilment of the request to which it
is attached is optional; instead it might emphasize the fact of the petition itself,
which creates a connection between the two in which the asker is subordinated
to the person asked, and flatters the latter. If that is the underlying logic of
terms like rogo, they are in Brown and Levinson’s terms elements of positive
politeness and in Hall’s terms elements of affiliative politeness.
If one takes uelim, quaeso, rogo, and peto this way, their usage fits perfectly
with Brown and Levinson’s framework. According to that framework positively
polite terms should be used particularly to intimates and inferiors, and those
are exactly the people to whom Cicero normally wrote letters – as noted above,
53% of his letters are addressed to his wife, his brother, or his closest friend,
and 55% of the requests using uelim, quaeso, rogo, and peto are found in those
letters. Many of the other addressees who receive these terms are clearly clients
of Cicero’s or in other ways his social inferiors; the pool of correspondents who
could reasonably be expected to be targets of negative politeness strategies is
far smaller.
But can the use of words meaning “I ask you” be explained as a positive
politeness strategy? In the context of Roman social relations, it can. The net-
works within which Cicero operated laid great stress on the mutual obligations
of friends, patrons, and clients. A great man was known by the number of
people who supported him in gratitude for favours received or in hopes of
favours to come; they paid court to him because he had the power to help
them, and he in turn was obliged to use that power for the good of those whom
he acknowledged to be his friends and clients (see, for example, Brunt 1988:
351–442; Deniaux 1993). In such a system the recipient of a favour was genuine-
ly obligated to the giver; he had to repay it immediately with conspicuous
gratitude and later, if he had the opportunity, by favours of his own. Therefore
asking for a favour was no light undertaking; the asker put himself in a position
analogous to that of a client and bound himself to future obligation if the
request was fulfilled.
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During the period to which almost all of his letters belong, Cicero’s exalted
status made him (at least in his own eyes) the ultimate patron. When someone
of that stature asked a favour, it would have been an honour to be the person
lucky enough to be asked; that fortunate individual would have the opportunity
to put Cicero under an obligation to him, to enjoy his kind words and gratitude
in the short run and to cash in the favour for something he himself needed in
the longer term. Of course, not everyone shared Cicero’s estimation of himself,
so the reality of the addressee’s perceptions may not always have measured up
to this ideal. This matters little, however, as Cicero seems often to have been
blissfully unaware of this gap in perception, and it is his own view of the social
relationships involved that would have governed his use of politeness terms.
Thus by using terms like rogo and peto that unambiguously stated his re-
quest for a favour, Cicero was indeed pursuing a positive politeness strategy.
Velim was less polite precisely because it was less direct; it did not acknowledge
that Cicero was putting himself in the position of a client, and therefore it was
not suitable for major requests.
The conclusion has to be that, despite its flaws, Brown and Levinson’s
framework has been useful in understanding the usage of these four terms: its
predictive powers allowed us to uncover an error in our initial assumptions
and reach a better understanding of what these terms meant. On the other
hand, the extent of those predictive powers turned out to be more limited than
is often assumed, for the lexical meanings of the terms under investigation
were capable of interpretation either as positive or as negative politeness. Al-
though Brown and Levinson seemed to offer the possibility of simply using a
dictionary to understand the workings of polite formulae, that offer proved
illusory: a careful examination of usage and an understanding of Roman cul-
ture were required to work out whether the terms in question were positively
or negatively polite. Compared to this examination, the work needed to employ
Terkourafi’s framework was not significantly more onerous.
On this point, therefore, both Terkourafi’s and Brown and Levinson’s
models were useful, but they led to different (though not unconnected) insights
and were therefore complementary rather than competitive. Hall’s theory was
not meaningfully distinct from Brown and Levinson’s on this point.
2.3 Oro in Cicero’s letters
With oro ‘I beg’ we have a different situation, as the first question is whether
the term is polite at all. Again, to apply Terkourafi’s framework we need to look
at how often and in what type of context oro is used with requests. The results
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of such a look, though less clear-cut than for the other four terms, point in the
same direction: oro occurs reasonably frequently in Cicero’s letters with re-
quests that appear from their contexts to be polite, and it is similarly used in
his other works (28 times in the letters and 23 times elsewhere). Most of the
contexts in which Cicero uses oro resemble ones in which he uses rogo, and in
three passages (examples (5)–(7) below) he uses both together, making it clear
that they can appear in exactly the same context:
(5) te, mi Curio, pro tua incredibili in me beneuolentia meaque item in te singu-
lari rogo atque oro ne patiare quicquam mihi ad hanc prouincialem moles-
tiam temporis prorogari. (Fam. 2.7.4, to Curio)
‘My own Curio, I ask and beg you, by your unbelievable goodwill to me
and by my own outstanding goodwill towards you, not to allow any time
at all to be added to my burden as provincial governor.’
(6) nunc, quoniam tuam iustitiam secutus tutissimum sibi portum prouinciam
istam duxit esse, etiam atque etiam te rogo atque oro ut eum et in reliquiis
ueteris negotiationis colligendis iuues et ceteris rebus tegas atque tueare.
(Fam. 13.66.2, to Servilius Isauricus)
‘Now, since [Caecina], relying on your sense of justice, has decided that
your province is his own safest harbour, I ask and beg you over and over
again to help him in picking up the pieces of his old business, and to
protect and look after him in other affairs.’
(7) etsi egomet, qui te consolari cupio, consolandus ipse sum, propterea quod
nullam rem grauius iam diu tuli quam incommodum tuum, tamen te magno
opere non hortor solum sed etiam pro amore nostro rogo atque oro te colli-
gas uirumque praebeas et qua condicione omnes homines et quibus tempori-
bus nos nati simus cogites. (Fam. 5.18.1, to T. Fadius)
‘I myself, who long to comfort you, am myself in need of comfort, because
for a long time I have not taken anything as hard as I take your misfortune;
nevertheless I not only urge you vigorously but even ask and beg you by
our love for each other to pull yourself together, show yourself a man, and
remember the general condition of mankind and the times in which we
were born.’
There is some debate about the interpretation of these passages, however: Ris-
selada (1993: 255) argues that they do not show a similarity between oro and
rogo because in them rogo always comes first and is followed by oro, so that
“what is at first presented as a (polite) optional directive is subsequently “cor-
rected” into an urgent supplication”. Now it is true that the order of rogo and
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oro is the same in all three examples, but these are all the examples of this
combination that Cicero produced: with so small a corpus we cannot be sure
that he actually had a consistent policy of putting one of these words before
the other. Moreover the reverse order (oro et rogo) occurs in other authors, such
as Marcus Aurelius (van den Hout 1988: 77 line 10) and Claudius Terentianus
(Youtie and Winter 1951: no. 467.17); in those authors the meaning of the pair
seems to be approximately the same as in Cicero despite the different order.
And the conjunction Cicero uses to join these two words is always atque “and,”
which indicates co-ordination rather than correction. Therefore Risselada’s in-
terpretation is probably wrong: these passages indicate that rogo and oro were
similar in meaning and usage.
Moreover, Cicero did not operate in a vacuum: many other Romans also
used oro for polite requests. The term was growing in popularity during his
time, and by the first century AD it was very frequent with polite requests,
including hundreds of electioneering graffiti and dipinti at Pompeii, where oro
uos faciatis ... ‘I beg you to elect ...’ was so universally employed (more than
300 examples are preserved) that it was usually abbreviated o.u.f.
Terkourafi’s theory would thus lead us to conclude that oro was probably
a conventionalized politeness expression when used with requests. Brown and
Levinson’s and Hall’s theories, however, offer little help this time: a term mean-
ing “I beg” could potentially express urgency (i.e., not be polite), or express
negative politeness (if it indicated that the addressee had the power to refuse
the request), or express positive politeness (if it expressed the speaker’s admira-
tion for the addressee’s power and his willingness to subordinate himself to
him).
Risselada’s conclusion that oro is not polite, however, was not drawn with-
out evidence. Her argument that oro is fundamentally different from the terms
meaning “I ask” is based on two passages (examples 8 and 9 below) in which
Cicero seems to make a distinction between oro and peto (Risselada 1993: 253–
255):
(8) peto igitur a te, uel, si pateris, oro, ut homines miseros et fortuna, quam
uitare nemo potest, magis quam culpa calamitosos conserues incolumis
uelisque per te me hoc muneris cum ipsis amicis hominibus, cum municipio
Caleno, quocum mihi magna necessitudo est, tum Leptae, quem omnibus
antepono, dare. (Fam. 9.13.3, to Dolabella)
‘So I ask you, or rather (if you let me) I beg you to save these people, who
are unfortunate more because of fortune which no-one can escape than
through their own fault, and to desire me to grant through you this favour
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not only to my friends themselves and to the town of Cales, with which I
am closely connected, but also to Lepta, whom I value above all others.’
(9) quam ob rem a te peto uel potius omnibus te precibus oro et obtestor ut in
tuis maximis curis aliquid impertias temporis, huic quoque cogitationi, ut
tuo beneficio bonus uir, gratus, pius denique esse in maximi benefici memo-
ria possim. (Att. 9.11a.3, to Caesar)
‘Therefore I ask you, or rather I beg and entreat you with all my prayers
to give, despite all your great cares, a bit of time to this consideration too:
how by your kindness I may show myself a good, a grateful, and a faithful
man in memory of an enormous obligation.’
In both these passages Cicero suggests that there is a difference between peto
and oro, and in the first he indicates that the use of oro might somehow be
unacceptable to the addressee; as it is difficult to see how a term that enhances
the politeness of a request could be unacceptable, this passage does appear to
show that in Cicero’s usage oro might not be polite, even in a context not
noticeably different from the ones quoted above.
But Cicero elsewhere makes a similar statement (10) about the use of rogo,
which everyone agrees is a polite term.
(10) itaque te uehementer etiam atque etiam rogo, magis quam a me uis aut
pateris te rogari, ut hanc cogitationem toto pectore amplectare. (Att. 12.35,
to Atticus)
‘And so I ask you earnestly over and over again, more than you want or
can bear to be asked by me, to embrace this problem for consideration
with your whole mind.’
If rogo is polite, how could Atticus not bear its use? And what does it mean
not to be able to bear being asked to do something? To take the second question
first, such inability could of course be displayed in many ways, many of them
rude, but if a valued friend asks one insistently to do something, the only
effective way to stop him from asking while maintaining the friendship is to
comply with the request: the person who cannot bear to be asked repeatedly
caves in quickly under pressure. It is therefore likely that what Cicero meant
when he said that Atticus could not bear him to make repeated requests was
that Atticus always granted them before Cicero needed to repeat them.
To return to the first question, how Atticus could fail to tolerate the use of
a polite term, the answer may lie in the type of politeness conveyed by rogo.
We have seen evidence that rogo was polite because it put the asker in a posi-
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tion analogous to that of a client, making clear his need for the addressee’s
greater power and undertaking to be bound by obligations in exchange for the
help he needed. In most circumstances, it was clearly pleasant for a Roman to
find himself being asked in such terms by the highest men in the land. But
there were limits, because part of one’s duty to one’s closest associates was to
be at hand for them, so that they were not reduced to having to beg for favours.
For example, a Roman who allowed his father to entreat him for a favour,
rather than granting it promptly, would have been behaving inappropriately.
Thus to say that a particular person does not allow one to ask him repeatedly
for favours is to praise that person’s devotion to oneself – a type of sentiment
that is fully in line with Cicero’s attitude to Atticus (cf. Att. 12.3, 12.5a, 12.18,
etc.), much more so than an interpretation that has Cicero complaining of Atti-
cus’ touchiness about his requests.
If indeed the words in (10) praise Atticus for being such a good friend that
he grants Cicero’s requests before Cicero has to make them twice, the same
interpretation would work just as well for (8). The addressee there, Dolabella,
had been Cicero’s son-in-law until shortly before the letter was written; the two
were never really intimate, but they clearly got along fairly well and remained
on good terms for some time after their family affiliation was ended by Dolabel-
la’s divorce from Cicero’s daughter. Under these circumstances, Dolabella
might well have been expected to grant Cicero’s requests without making his
former father-in-law beg first. Dolabella obviously did not have the opportunity
to do so in the course of the letter, as he would not receive it until the whole
thing had been written. But Cicero’s suggestion that he might not allow himself
to be entreated with oro gave Dolabella the opportunity to, as it were, cut in
between the peto and the oro and grant the favour forthwith, thus entitling
himself to the same sort of praise that Cicero was giving Atticus in (10).
Thus it seems likely that although there was some distinction in meaning
between peto and oro in Cicero’s usage, the two were not opposites but rather
allied: both were polite, and probably both were polite in the same way. Once
again, a politeness theory has been useful in clarifying our understanding of
the Latin; though this time Brown and Levinson’s framework was not helpful,
Terkourafi’s allowed us to investigate politeness by using factors other than
lexical meaning and thus to discover an element of polite usage that had previ-
ously been misidentified.
2.4 Requests benefitting the addressee
Sometimes the primary beneficiary of the fulfilment of a request is not the
speaker but the addressee; the speaker benefits only insofar as he or she de-
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rives vicarious pleasure from the addressee’s wellbeing, and the requests are
polite because they indicate that the speaker has enough affection for the ad-
dressee to get such vicarious pleasure. English expressions such as “Take care!”
(when used as an equivalent of “good-bye”) or “Have a great vacation!” fall into
this category. Such requests do not necessarily use the same polite modifiers
as the ones that benefit the speaker; for example “Could you have a great
vacation?” is not a politer version of “Have a great vacation!” the way “Could
you pass the salt?” is a politer version of “Pass the salt” (cf. Leech 2014: 180–
186, 212–214). The reason is that phrases making fulfilment of a request optional
only add politeness when the beneficiary is the speaker; when the beneficiary
is the addressee such phrases simply weaken the affectionate concern ex-
pressed by the request itself.
In Latin this use of the imperative is very common; the epistolary signing-
off formulae uale ‘fare well’ and cura ut ualeas ‘take care that you fare well’
are both examples. The five “please” equivalents we have been discussing can
all be used with such addressee-benefitting requests, and when this occurs
uelim, quaeso, rogo, and peto seem to follow the same hierarchy of magnitude
of request as they do for genuine requests: uelim and quaeso are used for more
minor requests and rogo and peto for more major ones. For example Cicero
uses uelim to ask friends to look after themselves generally (Fam. 5.21.5) and to
let him know what they would like him to do for them (Fam. 3.1.2); quaeso to
ask Atticus to look after himself when he has a minor illness (Att. 16.11.3); and
rogo to ask a friend to take courage in the face of serious adversity (Fam. 5.18.1).
Oro is also used this way (Q.fr. 3.1.25). Most interesting are (11) and (12), in
which Cicero uses rogo and peto to his beloved freedman Tiro to urge him to
do everything he can to recover from a serious illness.
(11) illud, mi Tiro, te rogo, sumptu ne parcas ulla in re, quod ad ualetudinem
opus sit. scripsi ad Curium quod dixisses daret. (Fam. 16.4.2)
‘My own Tiro, I ask you this: don’t spare expense in anything that is neces-
sary for your health. I have written to Curio and told him to give you
whatever you ask for.’
(12) audio te animo angi et medicum dicere ex eo te laborare. si me diligis, excita
ex somno tuas litteras humanitatemque, propter quam mihi es carissimus.
nunc opus est te animo ualere ut corpore possis. id cum tua tum mea causa
facias a te peto. (Fam. 16.14.2)
‘I hear that you are suffering in your soul, and that the doctor says that’s
why you’re ill. If you have any affection for me, arouse from its stupour
your interest in literature and your cultured humanity, on account of
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which you are so dear to me. Now you have to get well in spirit, so that
you will be able to recover in body. I ask you to do that, not only for your
sake but also for my own.’
It is notable that these addressee-benefitting requests generally follow the same
distribution of terms to individual addressees that we have already observed;
thus for example nearly all the passages of this sort in which Cicero uses quaeso
are addressed to Atticus, Quintus, or Terentia, while rogo tends to be used to
more distant acquaintances. Tiro, however, forms an interesting exception, in
that these two examples are the only case of rogo and the only case of peto
Cicero addresses to him. Cicero frequently makes requests of Tiro, but he never
phrases any that are for his own benefit as strongly as the two that are on
Tiro’s behalf.
These addressee-benefitting requests, I believe, provide the clinching evi-
dence for the real meaning of Cicero’s “please” equivalents. If these terms had
made fulfilment of requests optional, they would have been as unsuited to re-
quests benefitting the addressee as English “could you …?” is to “get well
soon”. But because they were elements of positive politeness, like the ad-
dressee-benefitting requests themselves, these terms were perfect for making
such requests particularly effective. The requests to Tiro used rogo and peto
because Cicero was trying to show his freedman that he cared so much about
him that he would consider himself indebted to Tiro if Tiro did him the favour
of recovering. Such an interpretation fits the contexts far better than one in
which Cicero by using rogo and peto gives Tiro the option of not recovering.
3 Conclusion
This analysis has shown that politeness theories can be helpful in understand-
ing even very well-known Latin expressions, even in texts that have already
been the subject of intensive study over a long period. Of course, it does not
show that politeness theories will necessarily be helpful in dealing with a given
problem, but it does indicate that they are worth trying.
Despite all its drawbacks, Brown and Levinson’s framework has some real
advantages that allow one to attain genuine insight into particular polite us-
ages, though it did not in this trial provide the easy shortcut that it is often
thought to offer, since extensive scrutiny of data was required in order to em-
ploy the theory usefully. Terkourafi’s theory was more consistently helpful than
any of the others, but it provided very different information from that offered
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by Brown and Levinson’s theory and so did not supplant it. The apparent disad-
vantage of Terkourafi’s theory, that it requires one to examine a large number of
actual examples of usage for each term considered, proved not to differentiate
it from Brown and Levinson’s theory in this trial. Hall’s theory was not mean-
ingfully different from Brown and Levinson’s on the points examined in this
study, and Watts’s framework was not helpful. While these results are clear for
this set of data, it is worth keeping in mind that the different theories did not
all have the same performance on all the questions investigated in this study,
and when investigating different questions or data sets different results would
be likely to emerge. Other politeness theories not investigated here might also
prove useful.
In fact, the specific results for the four politeness theories are much less
reliable than the more general finding that none of them can be simply applied
as a template to tell us, without further effort on our part, how Latin politeness
worked. Yet several of the theories have particular strengths that allow them,
if judiciously applied in the context of careful examination of evidence, to en-
hance our understanding. As a result, the best results are achieved by applying
several different frameworks to the same question.
The idea of using multiple frameworks seems to run counter to the very
concept of a theory: on a theoretical level only one of these frameworks can
actually be right. But since we cannot actually know for sure which one is right,
there is something to be said for following the method that can be empirically
demonstrated to be most useful, namely applying multiple frameworks.
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